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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LaVAR \Y. THATCHER, Administrator
of the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston,
deceased, ELL~\ IVORY LIVINGSTON,
GENIEL L. THATCHER, RUBY
LIVINGSTON, an incmnpetent, by Ella
Ivory Livingston, her guardian ad litem,
LESLIE L. WRIGHT, DAVID HALL
LIVINGSTON, an infant, by Ella Ivory
Livingston, his guardian ad litem,
Appellants,

CASE NO.
7689

-vs.ISABELLE MERRIAM, EDWIN N.
ROBERSTON, Administrator of the
Estate of Lillian Robertson, deceased,
and ELLEN COOK,
Respondents.

j

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of
respondents Isabelle Merriam, Edwin N. Robertson,
Administrator of the Estate of Lillian Robertson, deceased, and Ellen Cook, arid against all the appellants,
by which it was determined that the respondents were
the owners and holders of a Promissory Note dated
November 1, 1947, in the sum of $70,476.92 executed by
1
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defendant L. DeWayne Merriam, payable to the order
of Joseph F. Livingston, and that said respondents were
also the owners and holders of a Deed of Trust and
Chattel Mortgage which were executed and delivered
by defendant L. DeWayne Merriam to secure the payment of said Promissory Note, and which judgment also
determined that none of the appellants had or ever had
any right, title, claim, or interest in or to said Promissory
Note or in the indebtedness represented thereby or in
said Deed of Trust or Chattel Mortgage securing the
payment of said Promissory Note (R-30). One of the
original defendants in the action was L. DeWayne Merriam. He was served with Summons, but did not appear
and his default was entered. He was the maker of the
Promissory Note, Chattel Mortgage, and Deed of Trust.
Said L. DeWayne Merriam is taking no part in this appeal. The pages of the record will hereafter be referred
to in parenthesis with no other designation.
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS
This action was one commenced in the District Court
of Salt Lake County by the administrator of the Estate
of Joseph F. Livingston, deceased, and the heirs of said
decedent to have declared void and of no force and effect
a certain instrument designated "Assignment," dated
March 27, 1948, by which Joseph F. Livingston during his
lifetime attempted to make a gift of an obligation owed
to him by Lorin DeWayne Merriam, to three sisters of
said Joseph F. Livingston; namely, Isabelle Merriam,
Lillian Robertson, and Ellen Cook (1-3).
Lorin DeWayne Merriam is the same person as L.
2
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DeWayne Merriam and his first name is incorrectly
spelled in the transcript of the testimony "Lauren."
The case was tried before the Honorable Ray Van
Cott, Jr., without a jury on March 9, 1951.
The respondents in their original Answer did not set
forth any clain1 to the Promissory Note, Chattel Mortgage, and Deed of Trust, nor did they disclose upon what
theory they claimed to be the owners of said instruments.
However, at the close of the evidence, upon request of
counsel for appellants, counsel for respondents stated
that he claimed there was a gift of the note and the mortgages securing it by virtue of the execution and delivery
by the deceased of the Assignment (92). Counsel for
respondents at that time also amended the prayer of
the Answer "to include such further relief as the defendants are entitled to and particularly that it be adjudged
and determined that the three defendants are the owners
of the note and the mortgages securing the payment of
the note, which note is referred to in the Complaint and
which was introduced in evidence."
The obligation of Lorin DeWayne Merriam was
evidenced by a Promissory Note dated November 1, 1945,
signed by him, originally for the sum of $94,577.00, payable ten years after date in annual installments commencing November 1, 1946, with interest thereon at the
rate of 6% per annum from date, payable annually (Exhibit E). The payment of the obligation was secured by
a Deed of Trust dated April29, 1946, covering 5,260 acres
of real property situated in Rio Blanco and Moffat
Counties, State of Colorado, which was signed by Lorin
DeWayne Merriam (Exhibit B), and by a Chattel Mort3
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gage dated April29, 1946, which was also signed by Lorin
DeWayne Merriam (Exhibit C). The Chattel Mortgage
was on 3,141 head of sheep then located at Scenery Gulch,
west of Meeker, Colorado, and other personal property
. (Exhibit G).
On November 1, 1947, another Promissory Note was
executed and delivered to Joseph Franklin Livingston by
Lorin DeWayne Merriam for the sum of $70,476.92,
payable on or before ten years after date with interest
at the rate of 5% per annum from date thereof (Exhibit
D), in which it was provided that the Note was secured
by Deeds of Trust on lands in Moffat and Rio Blanco
Counties, Colorado, and by Chattel Mortgage on certain
sheep. The Note also provided that the maker agreed to
pay annually toward the obligation any and all net
profits realized from the operation of the mortgaged
sheep. This Note was apparently a renewal of the earlier
Note for $94,577.00 (41). This Note shows by indorsement in handwriting of one, A. H. Anderson, under date
of November 1, 1948, that interest was paid to date and
$5,476.92 was paid on the principal, leaving a balance on
the Note of $65,000.00 (38). Joseph F. Livingston died on
April 14, 1948. A short time before his death, according
to the testimony of Lester Cook, and Mrs. Isabelle Merriam, Joseph F. Livingston executed and delivered the
Assignment, Exhibit A. The instrument bears date of
March 27, 1948, and appears to have been acknowledged
on the same day before a Notary Public. According to
Mrs. Isabelle Merriam, who did not attend the trial, but
whose testimony was read from a deposition, the Assignment was delivered by Joseph F. Livingston to Isabelle
4
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.J[errianl and her two sisters, l\f r~. Cook and l\lrs. Robertson, while at the hon1e of 1\[r. and Mrs. Cook (7-l- ). Mrs.
~Ierrian1 believed that it was delivered on l\1 areh 26,
19-lS (76). Lester Cook also testified that he saw the
Assignment first on :Jiarch 26, 1948 (54). The te~timony
of :Jir. Cook (56) and l\Irs. ~lerriam (77) is to the effect
that the Assignment was taken to aN otary Public for the
signature of the Notary Public without Joseph F. Livingston being present (56), and without his personal acknowledgement.
Neither the Promissory Note dated November 1,
1945, Exhibit E, (58-59), nor the Promissory Note dated
November 1, 1947, Exhibit D, (37, 58, 62, 81), nor the
Deed of Trust, Exhibit B (59), nor the Chattel Mortgage
(61), a photostatic copy of which was prepared by the
County Recorder of Rio Blanco County, Colorado, Exhibit C, was delivered to the said three sisters of Joseph
F. Livingston, or to anyone on their behalf by Joseph
F. Livingston, or by anyone on his behalf during the lifetime of Joseph F. Livingston (58-59). The Chattel Mortgage had been filed in the office of the County Recorder
of Rio Blanco County, Colorado, on June 7, 1946 (Exhibit
C) and apparently remained on file there. The Deed of
Trust, Exhibit B, was filed for record in the office of
the County Recorder of Rio Blanco County, Colorado,
on June 7, 1946, and was apparently returned to Joseph
F. Livingston, and found by LaVar W. Thatcher among
the papers of Mr. Livingston the day after his death
(35). LaVar W. Thatcher also testified that he found the
copy of the Chattel Mortgage, Exihibt C, and the Promissory Note, Exhibit D, among the papers of Mr. Living5
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ston the day after his death (37). Mr. Thatcher found
the Promissory Note, Exhibit E, after the death of Mr.
A. H. Anderson, who was the manager of the sheep operations for the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, deceased,
(59-60) among the papers belonging to the Livingston
Estate in Mr. Anderson's desk (40-41). Mr. Anderson
died in August, 1950 (40). Mr. Cook testified that he had
the photostatic copy of the Chattel Mortgage, Exhibit
C, made (60) after the death of Mr. Livingston (61).
The Assignment, Exhibit A, was recorded in the
office of the County Recorder of Rio Blanco County,
Colorado, on April 30, 1948, 16 days after the death of
Joseph F. Livingston. It was apparently recorded at the
request of DeWayne Merriam whose name appears, together with his address, on the cover of the document
(Exhibit A).
The Assignment, Exhibit A, contained the following provisions in regard to the Assignment of the Deed
of Trust and the Promissory Note:
"* * * provided, however, that the undersigned assignor hereby reserves unto himself during his lifetime all amounts becoming due on the
principal of said promissory note and all amounts
in excess of the amounts periodically becoming
due thereon which the maker thereof under the
terms of said note may choose to pay on said principal during the lifetime of the assignor herein;
the interest on said principal amount to be paid
as said interest shall accrue, to the assignees
herein in the percentages hereinabove reserved,
i.e., 50% of said interest accruing to be paid to
said Isabelle Merriam, 25% of said interest accruing to be paid to said Lillian Robertson, and 25o/o
of said interest accruing to be paid to said Ellen
Cook, the undersigned hereby authorizing the
6
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maker of said note and nwrtgage to make payment of the amounts herein assigned to the persons nmned in the percentages herein mentioned
• * *" (Exhibit A, Pages 1 & 2) (4 & 5) (26 & 27).
The Assignment, Exhibit A, also contained the following provision in regard to the assignment of the
Chattel ~Iortgage and the Note securing the same:
"* • • being subject to the same terms and
conditions as hereinabove set forth, to-wit: reserving unto the assignor herein during his lifetime
all amounts becoming due on the principal of said
note and all amounts in excess of the amounts
periodically becoming due thereon which the
maker thereof under the terms of said note may
choose to pay on said principal during the lifetime
of the assignor herein, the interest on said principal amount to be paid as said interest shall accrue,
to the assignees herein in the percentages hereinabove reserved, i.e., 50% of said interest accruing to be paid to said Isabelle Mirriam, 25% of
said interest accruing to be paid to said Lillian
· Robertson, and 25% of said interest accruing to
be paid to said Ellen Cook, the undersigned hereby authorizing the maker of said note and chattel
mortgage to make payment of the amounts herein
assigned to the persons named in the percentages
hereinabove mentioned." (Exhibit A, Pages 2 &
3) (5 & 6) (27 & 28).
There is no evidence that Lorin DeWayne Merriam
was at any time prior to the death of Joseph F. Livingston notified by him of the purported assignment.
Lester Cook, who is one and the same person as
W. L. Cook, after the death of Joseph F. Livingston,
was on August 30, 1948, given a general power of attorney to act for Isabelle Merriam, Lillian Robertson,
and Ellen Cook (Exhibit F) (47 & 83).
7
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The evidence in the case consisted of the testimony
of three witnesses and Exhibits A to F inclusive. The
witnesses were LaVar W. Thatcher (34 to 42), the Administrator of the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, deceased, one of the appellants who was the only witness
for the plaintiffs; and Lester Cook (44 to 62 and 82 to
90), who is the husband of one of the respondents, Ellen
Cook, and the attorney in fact for Ellen Cook and Isabelle
Merriam, and who was the attorney in fact for Lillian
Robertson prior to her death; and Isabelle L. Merriam,
whose deposition was read into the record (62 to 81).
Mrs. Merriam is one of the respondents. Mr. Cook and
Mrs. Merriam were the only witnesses for the defendants.
The plaintiffs made objection to Mrs. Merriam becoming
a witness for the respondents because her testimony was
concerning statements by or transactions with Joseph
F. Livingston, or matters of fact which must have been
equally within the knowledge of the witness and Joseph
F. Livingston, it being claimed by appellants that Mrs.
Merriam was prohibited from being a witness by the
terms of Section 104-49-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated,
1943, (62, 63 & 64).
At the close of the trial in the District Court, the
original Exhibits D and E, being the Promissory Notes,
were by stipulation of the parties withdrawn and photostatic copies thereof were substituted.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
Appellants intend to rely upon the following points
for a reversal of the judgment of the Court below:
8
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POINT I.
Since by the instrument, designated Assignment,
Exhibit A, relied on by respondents as creating a gift,
Joseph F. Livingston retained during his lifetime present
and future dominion over the subject of the purported gift,
the attempted gift failed, and it was error for the Court to
find that all of the right, title, and interest of Josepb F.
Livingston in and to the Promissory Note, Exhibit D; the
Deed of Trust, Exhibit B; and the Chattel Mortgage, a
copy of which is Exhibit C; were assigned to respondents,
Isabelle Merriam and Ellen Cook and Lillian Robertson, and
to render judgment that the defendants Isabelle Merriam,
Edwin N. Robertson, Administrator of the Estate of Lillian
Robertson, deceased, and Ellen Cook, are the owners of
the Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage.
POINT D.
Since the Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel
Mortgage were all retained by Joseph F. Livingston and not
delivered to Isabelle Merriam, Ellen Cook, or Lillian Robertson, and the Promissory Note was not endorsed by Joseph
F. Livingston, it was error for the Court to find that, by the
purported Assignment, all of the right, title, and interest
of Joseph F. Livingston in and to the Promissory Note,
Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage referred to in said
Assignment were assigned to defendants Isabelle Merriam
and Ellen Cook and Lillian Robertson, and to render judgment that defendants Isabelle Merriam, Edwin N. Robertson, Administrator of the Estate of Lillian Robertson, deceased, and Ellen Cook are the owners of the Promissory
Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage.
9
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POINT III.
It was error for the Court to permit Isabelle Merriam
to be a witness and to testify in violation of Section 10449-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1943.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
Since by the instrument, designated Assignment,
Exhibit A, relied on by respondents as creating a gift,
Joseph F. Livingston retained during his lifetime present
and future dominion over the subject of the purported gift,
the attempted gift failed, and it was error for the Court to
find that all of the right, title, and interest of Joseph F.
Livingston in and to the Promissory Note, Exhibit D; the
Deed of Trust, Exhibit B; and the Chattel Mortgage, a
copy of which is Exhibit C; were assigned to respondents,
Isabelle Merriam and Ellen Cook and Lillian Robertson, and
to render judgment that the defendants Isabelle Merriam,
Edwin N. Robertson, Administrator of the Estate of Lillian
Robertson, deceased, and Ellen Cook, are the owners of
the Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage.

The subject of the claimed gift is divisible into two
parts, the principal of the obligation and the interest
thereon. The argument on Point I will apply only to
the principal of the obligation, and will not apply to the
interest thereon. We do not particularly urge that the
purported gift of the interest was ineffective because of
retention of dominion over and control of the same, how·
ever, we rely on the other points herein to reverse the
judgment of the lower court in that regard.
10
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A valid gift inter vivos must have no reference to
the future and must go into i1nmediate and absolute
effect. The donor must be divested of and the donee
invested with the right of property in the subject of the
gift. It nmst be absolute, irrevocable, and without reference to its taking place at some future time. The donor
must deliver the property and part with all present and
future dominion over it.
The above statement is supported by the following
citations: Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, et al. (1912)
41 Utah 3-10, 12-1 Pac. 765; In Re Romney's Estate (1922)
60 Utah 173, 207 Pac. 139; Peterson v. Weiner (Texas
1934) 71 SW 2d. 554; Stevenson v. Earl65 N.J. Eq. 721,
55 Atl. 1091, 103 Am. St. Rep. 790, 1 Ann. Cas. 49; Young
v. Young 80 N.Y. 437,36 Am. Rep. 634; Basket v. Hassell
107 U. S. 602, 27 L. Ed. 500, 2 Sup. Ct. R. 415, 28 C. J.
Gifts, Sections 5, 15, 21, 23, and 41, 12 R.C.L. 931.
Joseph F. Livingston reserved unto himself during
his lifetime the absolute right to the principal of the
obligation, not only to the amounts becoming due, but
also to any excess which the maker of the note might
choose to pay. The Note was payable on or before ten
years after date and could have been paid in full at any
time. This reservation was a complete dominion over
the principal of the gift. No part of the principal was
given to the purported donees. Mr. Livingston, the day
after the execution of the Assignment, could have received the entire principal due on the obligation if Lorin
DeWayne 1\ferriam decided to pay off the obligation.
Only the death of Mr. Livingston prevented him from
collecting the principal amount of the obligation. The
11
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attempted gift of the principal, therefore, could have no
effect in praesenti but could only take effect upon the
death of Mr. Livingston. The most that can be urged
regarding the principal of the obligation is that it was
an attempt to Inake a gift of the amount remaining unpaid on the principal, if any, at the death of Mr. Livingston. In other words, there was an attempt to make a
gift effective upon death of Mr. Livingston of the amount
remaining unpaid at the time of his death, which attempt
is testamentary in character and the instrument creating
it not being executed with the formalities of a Will is,
therefore, void.
"A gift of property to take effect after the
donor's death, the donor in the meanwhile retaining the control and dominion of the property,
cannot be sustained. Such gifts are in contravention of the Statutes governing the testamentary disposition of property. It is not necessary
that the condition that the property shall not pass
until the death of the donor be expressly stated,
in order to invalidate the gift as one inter vivos,
it being sufficient if the condition is implied. On
the other hand, if the gift is absolute, the mere
postponement of the enjoyment until the death of
the donor is not material and will not defeat it."
28 C. J. Gifts, Section 43.
Appellants are aware of the line of cases which hold
that a gift of an obligation retaining the income or
interest for life is under certain conditions valid. It is
our contention, however, that the instant case is clearly
distinguishable from those cases. In the line of cases
referred to the donor has divested himself of all control
over the principal which was the subject of the gift and
retained unto himself only the income or interest on the

12
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obligation. The donor in those cases divested himself
of all power to defeat the gift during his lifetime. The
subject of the gift was placed beyond the donor's power
and control, and there was nothing that the donor could
do in regard to the principal of the obligation. In this
case Mr. Livingston retained all control over the principal and could do with it as he saw fit. He retained within his power the right to defeat the gift of the principal
so that the gift was not absolute and immediately effective.
In the case of Peterson v. Weiner, supra, there is
a good discussion on the subject of retention and control
over a note, and it was there held that where the payee
of a note, who attempted to make a gift of it, retained
and collected payments thereon until his death, he could
not make a valid gift of the balance due on the note without making a Will. The court stated on Page 546 of 71
sw 2d.:
"Regardless of this proposition, however, he
undoubtedly had the right to collect and use the
monthly installments and to this extent had dominion over the note, and only his death could
defeat his perfect right to use both the principal
and interest of the note. There could be no gift
of any part of the note or the debt which the note
represented, so long as Eaton had such dominion
of the same, and such power to defeat the entire
gift.
"It is true that a person may retain a life
estate in property and convey the remainder
to another, but under such circumstances the
grantor only has the use of the property, and
cannot otherwise dispose of the property. It has
been held that one may give money to another, but
require the payment of interest during his life-
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time, but this is not inconsistent with the idea
that he has parted with the title to the principal.
"We conclude that Joseph Eaton did not part
with the absolute title of the indebtedness evidenced by the note and that he retained dominion
over the same in that he had a right to collect and
spend as he saw fit not only the interest, but the
principal provided for in the note, and this right
could only be questioned by his dying before all
the payments became due."
The above case is strikingly in point with the instant
case and it and the other authorities cited support our
contention that Joseph F. Livingston retained such dominion over and control of the principal of the purported
gift as to defeat it. We are not aware of any case where
the donor has retained such control of and dominion over
the purported gift, as retained by Mr. Livingston in the
instant case, where the court has held that there was a
valid gift.
In the instant case, although the administrator of
the estate of, and the heirs of Joseph F. Livingston were
the plaintiffs, the persons who sought to prove a gift
were the supposed donees of the gift, they being Isabelle
Merriam and Ellen Cook, and Edwin N. Robertson, Administrator of the Estate of Lillian Robertson, deceased.
The last three were defendants in the action, but they
had the burden to establish all of the facts essential to
the validity of the gift by clear and convincing proof.
There seems to be no conflict in the authorities on this
point and in support of our position we cite the following
cases: Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, et. al, 41 Utah
340, 124 Pac. 765; Bowline v. Cox 26 So. 2d. 574; Storr
v. Storr, 69 NE 2d. 916; Re Hamilton's Estate (Wash.
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1946) 174 Pac. :2d. 301; and In Re Scherzinger's Estate
74 N.Y.S. 2d. 756.
POINT II.
Since the Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel
Mortgage were all retained by Joseph F. Livingston and not
delivered to Isabelle Merriam, Ellen Cook, or Lillian Robertson, and the Promissory Note was not indorsed by Joseph
F. Livingston, it was error for the Court to find that, by the
purported Assignment, all of the right, title, and interest
of Joseph F. Livingston in and to the Promissory Note,
Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage referred to in said
Assignment were assigned to defendants Isabelle Merriam
and Ellen Cook and Lillian Robertson, and to render judgment that defendants Isabelle Merriam, Edwin N. Robertson, Administrator of the Estate of Lillian Robertson, deceased, and Ellen Cook are the owners of the Promissory
Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage.

In 25 A.L.R. Pages 642 to 685 appears a lengthy
and comprehensive annotation on the subject "Delivery
of bond or note of third persons by way of gift." Section
(g) of said annotation deals with "delivery by separate
writing," Pages 662 to 665. It appears that courts of
other states have held both ways on the question of
whether a note can be given by a separate writing and by
the donor retaining possession of the note. We have
found no Utah case on the subject. There is also a Section (e) in said annotation, Pages 659 to 661 on the
subject "Necessity for Indorsement." The cases there
cited are from other states and none from Utah, and
some support the validity of a gift by delivery of the
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instrument merely, without indorsement or other writing,
while others hold that the gift failed for lack of indorsement and delivery. A significant fact, however, is that
no case is set forth in the annotation which holds that
there is a valid gift of a note or other instrument where
the note or other instrument has been retained by the
person who attempted to make the gift, where the note
was not endorsed and where the person attempting the
gift has retained dominion and control, over the subject
of the gift, during his lifetime.
In discussing the case of Young v. Young, 80 N.Y.
422, 36 Am. Rep. 634, the following appears in the annotation commencing on Page 675:
"In Young v. Young, N.Y., supra, there was
held to be no valid gift of bonds where the owner,
intending to give them to his son, indorsed upon
the envelope containing the bonds memoranda indicating such ownership, followed by a statement
that the interest was to belong to him as long as
he lived, but where there was no actual delivery
from the donor to the donee. The court, after
stating the general rule applicable to gifts, says
that the first question is whether a gift of an
instrument securing the payment of money can
be made in praesenti, reserving to the donor the
accruing interest. Answering this question, the
court says : 'I can conceive of but one way in
which this is possible, and that is by an absolute
delivery of the security which is the subject of the
gift to the donee, vesting the entire legal title
and possession in him on his undertaking to account to the donor for the interest which he may
collect thereon. But if the donor retains the instrument under his control, though he do so
merely for the purpose of collecting the interest,
there is an absence of the complete delivery which
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is absolutely essential to the validity of a gift.
A gift cannot be 1nade by creating a joint possession of donor and donee, even though the intention be that each shall have an interest in the
chattel, especially where, as in this case, the line
of division between these interests is not ascertainable. The reservation of the interest on the
bonds to the donor was for an uncertain periodthat is, during his lifetime and until his death; it
was impossible to determine the precise proportion of the money secured by the bonds, to which
the donee was entitled. If, therefore, the donor
retained the custody of the bonds for the purpose
of collecting the accruing interest, or even if they
were placed in the joint custody or possession of
himself and the donee, there was no sufficient delivery to constitute a gift. But if an absolute delivery of the bonds to the donee with intent to pass
the title was made out, the donor reserving only
the right to look to the donee for interest, the
transaction may be sustained as an executed
gift.'"
.Another exhaustive annotation on the question of
the necessity for delivery in effectuating a gift is found
in 63 .A.L.R. 537. This annotation discusses the question
as to whether or not a gift may be effectively made by
the execution of a formal instrument, such as an Assignment, without the actual delivery of the subject of the
gift. The annotation frankly concludes that on this
question there is a division of authority, some cases holding the delivery of the Assignment to be sufficient, others
reaching a contrary result. It is noted, however, that in
most of the cases supporting the proposition that a gift
can be effectuated by the execution and delivery of a
formal instrument, the actual delivery of the subject
of the gift was impracticable. Several cases are cited

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

where the "donor" attempted to effect a gift of items
of personal property such as horses and cattle (Gordon
v. Young 10 Kentucky Law Reports 681), piano and other
furniture (In Re Fenton 182 Iowa 346, 165 NW 463)
and money that was secreted in a hidden cache in the
corner of a brickyard (Sylvain v. Page 276 Pac. 16, 63
A.L.R. 528). Appellants have no quarrel with the results reached in the cases where the delivery of the
subject matter of the gift would be impracticable. However, the annotation referred to lists a considerable
number of cases which hold that the mere execution and
delivery of a formal instrument without delivering the
subject of the gift is insufficient. Included in this line
of cases are several where the purported gift involved
is a promissory note.
In the case of Allen-West Commision Company v.
Grumbles 63 C.C.A. 401, 129 Fed. 287, a husband executed a written Assignment in the form of a bill of sale
transferring to his wife all of his interest in a corporation of which he was a stockholder. He retained the
stock certificates in his own possession, left his stock
in his own name, voted the stock and received the dividends therefrom. After becoming insolvent he transferred the certificates to his wife by indorsement, and by
surrender of the certificates to her without referring
to the previous assignment. In an action brought by
husband's creditors, the court stated:

"* * * It is true that in cases where manual
delivery of the subject of the gift, or of the evidences which command it, is impracticable or impossible, and in cases in which a written conveyance is the most effectual mode of devesting the
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donor of dmninion and control of the thing, such
a conveyance is sufficient. But it is equally true
that a written assignment is utterly inadequate,
where the delivery of the subject of the gift or of
the delivery of the evidences of it is practicable,
and the latter is the more ready and efficient way
of commanding the dominion and control of the
subject of the gift."
Although the question before the court was whether
the written Assignment was valid as against creditors
of the husband, it was undoubtedly the court's opinion
from the language used in the case that even as between
the donor and donee, the Assignment was ineffective.
In the case of Cox v. Hill, 6 Md. 274, a "donor" executed a writing reciting that in consideration of love and
affection, he assigned and paid over to "donee" a certain
debt represented by a note, reserving to the donor the
interest during her natural life. This writing was delivered to donee, but there was no delivery of the note.
The court held that there was no completed gift where
the note was retained by the donor.

It appears to appellants that our Utah Statute, Section 61-1-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, has some
bearing on the problem before the court. This St~tute
is as follows:
"Section 61-1-31. What Constitutes Negotiation.
"An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such manner
as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof.
If payable to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery;
if payable to order, it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery."
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The Note in the instant case was payable to the
order of Joseph Franklin Livingston, also known as
Joseph F. Livingston, so our Statute was not complied
with either by indorsement or by delivery.
In the instant case the intended gift, if in fact one
was intended, was not the "Assignment" but was rather
the "Note" itself. It was the item of value. But Joseph
Livingston did not part with its possession nor did he
resort to the simple device of indorsing the note to the
"donees." Rather, he elected to hold the subject matter
of the alleged gift in his own possession and under his
own control. By so doing, it is submitted he did not make
an effective delivery thereof.
POINT III.
It was error for the Court to permit Isabelle Merriam
to be a witness and to testify in violation of Section 10449-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1943.

Isabelle Merriam by her deposition was permitted
to be a witness over objection of appellants, concerning
the purported delivery of Assignment and to testify
about statements made by Joseph F. Livingston and
other matters of fact equally within her knowledge, and
that of the deceased Joseph F. Livingston. This was in
direct violation of Section 104-49-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which is as follows:
"104-49-2. Who May Not Be Witnesses.
"The following persons cannot be witnesses:
"(3) A party to any civil action, suit or
proceeding, and any person directly interested in
the event thereof, and any person from, through
or under whom such party or interested person
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matter

~owl~

deriYes hi~ interest or title or any part thereof,
when the adverse party in such action, suit, or
proceeding claims or oppose~, sue~, or defends,
as guardian of an insane or incompetent person,
or as the executor or adn1inistrator, heir, legatee,
or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian,
assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such
heir, legatee or devisee, as to any statement by,
or transaction with, such deceased, insane, or incompetent person, or matter of fact whatever,
which must have been equally within the knowledge of both the witness and such insane, incompetent or deceased person, unless such witness is
called to testify thereto by such adverse party so
claiming or opposing, suing, or defending, in such
action, suit or proceeding."
There can be no question concerning the parties in
this case being covered by the provisions of the Statute.
Mrs. ~Ierriam, the witness, was a party to the action.
The adverse parties were the administrator and heirs
of the deceased person.
There can also be no question but that Mrs. Merriam
was a witness as to statements by, transactions with, and
matter of fact, which must have been equally within the
knowledge of both herself and Joseph F. Livingston.
Mrs. Merriam was not called to testify by the adverse party, but was a witness for herself and her codefendants.
The respondents in the court below took the position
that since LaVar W. Thatcher, one of the appellants,
was placed on the witness stand and testified, appellants
thereby waived objections to the competency of Mrs.
Merriam to testify.
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Mr. Thatcher testified that he first saw the instruInent, designated as Assignment, Exhibit A, at Mrs.
Cook's home on Preston Avenue on the occasion of the
taking of the deposition of Mrs. Merriam, about three
weeks before the trial (35). The trial was on March 9,
1951. The deposition of Mrs. Merriam was taken on
~f arch 15, 1951. Mr. Thatcher also testified about the
finding of the Deed of Trust, Exhibit B (35), the day
after Mr. Livingston's death in Mr. Livingston's home;
that he took it to Mr. Anderson's home, and later to Mr.
N eslen's office, and later it was given to Mr. Anderson
to deliver to Mr. Cook. He identified the signatures of
Lorin (misspelled in the record Lauren) DeWayne Merriam, and of A. H. Anderson on Exhibit B. He also testified about the finding of the photostatic copy of the Chattel Mortgage, Exhibit C, among the papers of Mr. Livingston the day after Mr. Livingston's death (37). Also Mr.
Thatcher testified about finding the ·Note for $70,476.92,
Exhibit D, in the same place (37) and that he handled
Exhibits C and Din the same manner as Exhibit B. He
also testified about finding the Note for $94,957.00,
Exhibit E, among the papers belonging to the Estate
of Joseph F. Livingston in the desk of A. H. Anderson
the day after the death of Mr. Anderson in August, 1950,
( 40 & 41). Although some statutes so provide (58 Am.
Jur., Witnesses, Section 357, Page 210), Section 104-492 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, does not remove the
disqualification of an adverse witness when a protected
party offers testimony.
Even in states where the statute provides in effect
that the prohibition shall not extend to a transaction or
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communication with a deceased to which a protected
person is examined on his own behalf, the waiver does
not apply where the protected person does not testify
to any fact he was not at liberty to testify to without
making an election under the Statute. 58 Am. Jur.,
Witnesses, Sec 357, Page 210. ~Ir. Thatcher did not
testify concerning any statement made by Mr. Livingston on or about March 27, 1948, nor concerning the supposed delivery of the instrument designated Assignment.
Several Utah case have construed our Statute. Maxfield v. Sainsbury (1946) 110 Utah 280, 172 Pac. 2d. 123,
is one of the recent cases, and it was decided in that case
that the witness to be disqualified must be one whose interests are against the estate of the deceased where the
representative of the estate objects to the witnesses
testifying. Certainly in the present case before the
court, the interests of Mrs. Merriam was adverse to those
of the estate because she was seeking part of the assets
of the estate. In the Maxfield v. Sainsbury case, supra,
Justice Wolfe, in an opinion (concurring specially),
makes a comprehensive analysis of the Statutes as to
what persons are disqualified thereunder from testifying.
Mrs. Merriam certainly is included among the persons
who by our Statute may not be witnesses and may not
testify adversely to the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston,
deceased, as to statements by Joseph F. Livingston and
to matters of fact which were equally within the knowledge of both Mr. Livingston and Mrs. Merriam. There
can be no serious doubt but that the trial court committed
error in permitting Mrs. Merriam to testify.
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CONCLUSION
Because Joseph F. Livingston retained control of
and dominion over the principal of the obligation, part of
the subject of the claimed gift, the claimed gift of the
principal of the obligation failed. The judgment of the
lower court should be reversed as to the principal of the
obligation and it should be determined that the principal
of the obligation is and always has been part of the assets
of the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, deceased.
Because there was no delivery of the Promissory
Note and no indorsement of it, the claimed gift, including the interest on the obligation, failed and it should be
determined that the interest, as well as the principal
of the obligation,, is, and always has been, a part of the
assets of the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, deceased.
The trial court erred in permitting Isabelle Merriam
to be a witness and to testify as she did.
For the reasons cited, appellants submit that all the
points urged are meritorious and that th~ judgment of
the lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
EVANS, NESLEN, MANGUM
& MORRIS,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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